This research investigates the cost asymmetry between hypergrowth and non-hypergrowth firms by using private fintech firms in the United Kingdom (U.K.) as a sample. Examining cost growth elasticity and cost multiplier elasticity, the findings indicate that hypergrowth firms’ cost growth elasticity and cost multiplier elasticity are significantly lower than those of non-hypergrowth firms. The results show that, in private fintech firms, cost asymmetry can occur between non-hypergrowth and hypergrowth stages, which is different from prior asymmetry findings that focused only on the revenue-increasing and revenue-decreasing stages. Our study further provides empirical evidence of the static internal economies of scale from which hypergrowth firms benefit, serving as one of the explanations for cost asymmetry in the hypergrowth stage. Overall, our findings suggest that U.K. private fintech companies gain a cost advantage during the hypergrowth stage by balancing the finding of new opportunities with successfully reaping high-quality revenues while effectively dealing with managerial inefficiency.

Although multiple studies have confirmed the instances of irrational Say-On-Pay (SOP) voting and pay-for-luck compensation, the assessment of executive compensation under these occurrences remained unrevealed prior to our research. This research attempts to address these limitations by defining irrational SOP voting and pay-for-luck variables and modifying the SOP voting determinants model, drawing on information-processing theory. The objectives are to investigate: the moderating effect of executive pay misassessment linked to irrational SOP voting and pay-for-luck compensation on CD&A usefulness, reflected by the association between excessive pay and SOP voting outcomes and the association between pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) and SOP voting outcomes, and shareholder awareness of pay-for-luck compensation, indicated by the association between pay-for-luck and SOP voting outcomes. The results show the significant moderating roles of executive compensation misassessment and pay-for-luck compensation on SOP voting outcomes and shed light on the unawareness of executive pay-for-luck. Overall, this study demonstrates a better explanation of SOP voting decisions through the lens of information-processing theory. Additionally, it provides new evidence of the PPS assessment concerning shareholders unawareness of pay-for-luck compensation.